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I. INTRODUCTION
There are signs that the United States may be entering a second
wave of "no-fault" reforms to traditional auto accident tort law. A first
wave, with both academic and legislative initiatives, peaked in the 1960s
and early 1970s and then subsided.' Today, twenty-six states plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have some sort of auto no-fault
system. 2 In recent years, three states-Georgia, Nevada, and Connecti-
cut-have repealed no-fault,3 no state has enacted no-fault in the past
twenty years,4 and California voters have rejected a no-fault ballot
initiative.'
First-wave no-fault systems now have a record for study and evalu-
ation. Meanwhile, the contemporary second wave is impelled by several
converging factors: advocacy by no-fault proponents, a generalized
interest in anti-liability "tort reform," and persisting concern over high
auto insurance costs. No-fault bills and ballot initiatives have prolifer-
ated, prompting an occasion for debate and assessment. At the federal
* Professor of Law, American University Law School. The author thanks Margaret Burns
for research assistance.
1. See Fred Holender, Basic No-Fault Insurance Seeks to Speed Recovery, Bus. FIRST OF
BUFF., Oct. 6, 1997, at 28.
2. See id.
3. See Christopher Swope, No-Fault: How It's Totaled Every Time, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 21, 1997, at Fl.
4. See Richard D. Hailey, Traveling Same Old Road, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1997, at 12A.
5. See Swope, supra note 3.
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level, Congressional activity on behalf of no-fault has recently taken the
form of the proposed Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997.6
This Article will analyze moral and policy issues raised by the
emerging debate. Throughout, I will focus on personal injury issues and
will not touch on property damage issues. Some of the issues discussed
have been the subject of disputed empirical studies, while others are
subject to contentious value disputes. I will attempt to map out those
considerations that are necessary for a careful evaluation.
In some respects, the new debate simply recapitulates issues and
arguments from the first no-fault wave, but at the same time there are
new complexities in the debate for two reasons. First, there has now
been actual experience with no-fault schemes, and studies and evalua-
tions have been made. Second, there are novel no-fault proposals, not
just in response to criticisms of traditional tort, but also in response to
criticisms of existing first-wave no-fault schemes.7 Compared with the
first-wave, the second-wave debate may be both more sophisticated and
more confusing.
Tort law delivers compensation to accident victims from the pocket
of the driver at fault, or from that driver's insurer. No-fault compensa-
tion schemes depart from this in two crucial respects. First, tort suits for
auto accident injuries are curtailed. Second, compensation comes with-
out proof of any party's fault from the victim's own first-party accident
insurance coverage, which he is required to carry.8 Essentially, no-fault
narrows auto accident victims' rights to seek compensation from cul-
prits, requiring victims to accept compensation instead from coverage
they have been forced to buy. The principal argument for such an
arrangement is that it benefits victims by delivering compensation more
rationally, efficiently, and cost-effectively than the tort system does.
The main arguments against no-fault are that it does not function more
effectively than the tort system, and that no-fault carries disadvantages
that outweigh its advantages. No-fault's disadvantages are chiefly two-
6. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S. 625, 105th Cong.; Auto Choice Reform Act of
1997, H.R. 2021, 105th Cong. The Act would create a particular national no-fault system, but
would observe federalism concerns by allowing individual states to opt out of the system under
certain circumstances. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, § 8. In order to focus here on the
substantive merits of no-fault schemes, this Article foregoes commentary on federalism issues.
For background and perspectives on the Auto Choice Reform Act, see Kathy Kristof, Armey
Bill Would Alter Auto Insurance Landscape, Bus. FIRST OF COLUMBUS, Oct. 3, 1997, at 19,
available in 1997 WL 15122019; Betty Joyce Nash, Auto Act Takes Its Cue From 'No-Fault'
Plans, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 1997, at El, available in 1997 WL 7627148.
7. See Kristof, supra note 6, at *3. See also Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S. 625, 105th
Cong., § 2.
8. Under first-party insurance, an accident victim is indemnified for losses by an underwriter
from whom he has bought coverage directly. This contrasts with third-party compensation in a
tort system, where losses are typically indemnified by the underwriter of the injury-causing party.
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fold: (1) loss of tort law's purported role in deterring unsafe driving;
and (2) loss of tort law's purported corrective justice function in secur-
ing recompense for injury victims from culprits who inflict injury.
This Article will analyze four basic variations of auto accident
compensation schemes: (1) tort; (2) "pure" no-fault, which bars sub-
stantially all tort actions, substituting first-party coverage for injuries;
(3) "partial" no-fault, which also provides first-party coverage and bans
tort suits for certain damages, but allows tort suits for other damages;
and (4) recently-devised "choice" proposals that allow drivers to choose
between first-party coverage and tort compensation. 9
Clear and thorough analysis is difficult, however, because even
these four systems do not exhaust the range of possible schemes. In
particular, a variety of different partial no-fault and choice schemes have
been or could be devised by combining and substituting basic elements.
Moreover, both partial no-fault and choice schemes lie in the middle
ground between pure tort and pure no-fault. Depending on specifics, a
given plan in this middle ground may resemble pure tort or pure no-
fault. With these caveats in mind, this Article attempts to organize the
discussion with an appropriate amount of detail to grasp essential issues
encapsulated in the contemporary debate.
These four contrasting schemes will focus around four main
themes: (1) whether no-fault delivers compensation more efficiently
than tort; (2) whether no-fault undermines tort's role in deterring unsafe
driving; (3) whether no-fault wrongly abandons the "corrective justice"
function served by tort; and (4) whether no-fault is especially beneficial
or especially harmful to low-income motorists.
II. BASIC INSURANCE CRITIQUES OF TORT
Advocacy for no-fault originates in criticism of the tort system as a
costly, inefficient, and irrational means of delivering compensation to
auto accident victims. It focuses on tort as a system of compensation, to
the exclusion of other objectives associated with tort: deterrence and
corrective justice. To the extent one views tort exclusively as a compen-
sation system, no-fault is likely to appear superior. On the other hand, to
whatever extent one credits or values tort's deterrent and corrective jus-
tice aspects, no-fault will appear less advantageous, or even detrimental.
Several compensation-oriented critiques of the tort system are dom-
inant. First, tort litigation costs and attorneys' fees drain extravagant
9. A fifth major type of scheme will not be analyzed specifically here: "add-on" schemes,
whereby rights to bring tort suits are left unaltered, but no-fault first-party coverage is made
available or mandatory, and tort recoveries may be passed through to reimburse no-fault insurers.
1998]
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portions of insurance premium funds away from victim compensation. 1°
Hence, by eliminating tort suits, expanded compensation and/or reduced
premiums could be achieved.
Second, tort confines compensation to victims of negligent driving,
thereby excluding many who are comparably injured and needy, but
who receive nothing because they cannot prove that some other party
was at fault. One study suggests that only thirty-seven percent of auto
accident victims receive a tort recovery, while twenty-three percent
receive no compensation at all.'I The low level of recovery stems, in
part, from the requirement of proving negligence to recover in tort. By
eliminating fault as a prerequisite to recovery, no-fault delivers compen-
sation more widely and less arbitrarily.
Third, tort systematically produces over-compensation of less-
severely injured victims and under-compensation of poor or more seri-
ously injured ones. Because litigation is risky and costly, defendants
often settle small claims at inflated levels attractive to plaintiffs.' 2 By
contrast, plaintiffs with large claims and poor plaintiffs tend to avoid the
prolonged litigation needed to secure full compensation, opting instead
to settle early for less.
1 3
Fourth, the tort litigation process delays delivery of compensation,
compared with how long a straightforward first-party insurance system
takes."'
Fifth, auto accident cases strain court systems by their sheer num-
bers.15 Many cases may be too commonplace or trivial to warrant such
resource drain.
Finally, the tort system creates incentives to create fraudulent
claims and to overstate injuries. Fraud ranges from the staging of acci-
10. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL, EFFECTS OF AN AUTO-CHOICE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLAN
ON COSTS AND PREMIUMS 2 (Rand Inst. for Civil Just. 1997) (no-fault insurance cuts costs,
because the need to litigate negligence is eliminated); see also Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?,
106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1277 (1997) (book review) (providing that the tort system is slow,
undercompensates those who need fast cash, overcompensates those with minimal losses, because
defendants settle for more to avoid litigation, and that system features high transaction costs).
11. See ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 148-49 (1964).
12. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 1277.
13. See id. See also Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer
Choice for Auto Insurance in All Fifty States, 55 MD. L. REV. 160, 177 (1996); Clarence Morris &
James C.N. Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 914
(1962). But see Fleming Jamer, Jr. & Stuart C. Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A
Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70, 76 (1952) (larger claims take longer to settle).
14. See Mitch McConnell et al., Auto Insurance: A Better Way, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1997,
at A22.
15. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, STANDARDS
FOR No-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT BENEFITS ACT, S. REP. No. 95-975 (2d Sess. 1978)
[hereinafter STANDARDS FOR No-FAULT].
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dents to more genteel forms. Overstatement is inherently in the interest
of particular claimants. 6
There is little that tort defenders can say directly in response to
these critiques. The premium drain point is undeniable. Tort entails liti-
gation that is superfluous to a first-party compensation scheme, diverting
premium dollars away from compensation. There is no response in
defense of the tort system except to say that it is not solely a compensa-
tion system.
Tort defenders would also note that first-party compensation
schemes will generate their own litigation costs and lawyer fees, while
avoiding those of tort. Litigation issues under no-fault would include
scope of policy coverage and other contractual ambiguities, cause of
accident, and degree of damage. Premiums will be drained away from
compensation in order to resolve such issues. One can only guess how
these drains compare with current tort-system drains. I have found no
study addressing the question. A reasonable guess is that the no-fault
drain, though substantial, should be smaller than the tort drain. In a
first-party insurance market, underwriters can compete to offer low pre-
miums to customers by finding ways to minimize dispute-driven pre-
mium drain through contractual clarity and low-cost dispute resolution.
Equivalent market forces to reduce dispute costs cannot so easily operate
in a tort system between adversarial parties not covered by prior
contracts.
Requiring proof of fault also excludes many victims from compen-
sation. Again, the charge cannot be denied, but only answered by point-
ing out that a fault-based tort system is not the same animal as a loss-
based compensation system. Another possible response is to propose a
non-fault-based (strict liability) recovery rule for auto tort cases. 17 The
merits and demerits of that suggestion, however, are beyond the scope of
this analysis. Nevertheless, such a reform is not in the current political
winds. Contemporary no-fault debate focuses on first-party insurance
coverage, not third-party tort recovery.
Charges of over- and under-compensation in tort actions are diffi-
cult to deny. It has been estimated that for out-of-pocket losses under
$500, victims on average receive four and a half times their loss from
the tort system, while victims with over $25,000 in out-of-pocket losses
receive, on average, only around a third of their losses. 8 This feature
16. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 105TH CONG., THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS OF AUTO-
CHOICE 4 (Apr. 1997); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PRESS
RELEASE 3 (May 24, 1995) (on file with author).
17. See REPORT BY COMM. TO STUDY COMPENSATION OF AUTO ACCIDENTS, COLUMBIA UNIV.
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 132-44 (1932).
18. See STANDARDS FOR No-FAULT, supra note 15.
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emerges from tort's adversarial and fault-based aspects. If loss-based
indemnity is the only object, these compensation "errors" can be
curtailed.
The charge of delay is equally undeniable. Delivery of compensa-
tion is undoubtedly quicker if it does not turn on proving fault in litiga-
tion. The strain on courts point is true, as well. If fewer cases get
litigated, court burdens lighten. Of course, this is no more true of auto
cases than of medical malpractice, product liability, toxic tort, or busi-
ness tort cases. These other types of cases, though less numerous than
auto cases, tax courts in a different way by virtue of their complexity. In
varying degrees, they could also be swept from the dockets by enacting
no-fault compensation schemes.
Similarly, the fraud and overstatement charge is also true, though
whether it is truer of auto than of other tort cases is unproved. Cur-
tailing tort suits might diminish some such abuse, but it will by no
means, eliminate abuse, since temptations to commit fraud and to over-
state injuries also characterize straightforward insurance schemes. Suc-
cessful reduction of incentives toward abuse may depend on whether a
given no-fault scheme succeeds in reducing access to the pain and suf-
fering damages offered under tort law. Availability of such damages
may fan the flames of temptation toward fraud and overstatement.
III. No-FAULT, TORT, AND DETERRRENCE
Critics of no-fault contend that curtailing tort suits will cause traffic
injuries to rise because dangerous driving will not be checked by the fear
of lawsuits.' 9 Defenders of no-fault essentially make two responses to
this criticism-one weak, the other stronger.
The first response is that no-fault schemes can provide meaningful
deterrence against unsafe driving through an experience-rated premium
device.2" Because unsafe motorists would be charged higher premiums,
drivers would feel a direct financial interest in driving safely.2' This
argument is dubious. At best, it holds true only if drivers can be classi-
fied with meaningful precision so that premium charges can be accu-
19. See Frank A. Sloan, Tort Liability Versus Other Approaches for Deterring Careless
Driving, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 53, 68 (1994) (finding that tort liability deters careless
driving); see also Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L.
REV. 1093, 1111-15 (1993) (finding that no-fault cuts administrative costs and rationalizes
compensation, but it decreases motorist incentives to reduce risk, and thus, increases overall
accident costs).
20. See Arlen, supra note 19, at 1108-10 (proper deterrence requires experience-rated
premiums so injurers bear costs of risks they create); see also Sean Mooney, Risk Classification
Helps Cut Your Losses, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BEN. MGMT., Sept. 29,
1997, at 65.
21. See Arlen, supra note 19, at 1108-10.
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rately gauged to reflect driver safety. The only conceivably affordable
mechanism for this is to set premiums based on thenumber and severity
of moving violations and accidents. But, the incidence of tickets and
accidents is far too multi-causal and random to correlate substantially
with driver dangerousness.
Premium-setting based on the number and severity of accidents
might be rational from the standpoint of underwriter profitability
because it predicts average likelihood of payout. For that reason, such
premium-setting makes as much sense under no-fault as it does under
tort. But, such premium-setting has little power, in itself, to induce safe
driving because, within a broad range of driving habits, a driver's
number or severity of accidents is poorly correlated with how danger-
ously he drives. It correlates more strongly with general accident rates
in the areas where he drives.
Underwriters cannot easily implement true safety rating in a profit-
able manner. They maximize profit by correlating the premiums
charged to any insured with the likelihood of making payouts to that
insured. The elaborate information gathering needed to implement
meaningful safety rating would probably cost far more than any benefit
provided in improving the correlation between premiums charged and
driver safety.
Sophisticated data would have to be developed on relationships
between driving records and the likelihood of causing accidents. Infor-
mation on moving violations would have to be analyzed along with acci-
dent and claim records. Huge uncertainties would stem from undetected
traffic violations, unreported accidents, and vagaries in criminal adjudi-
cations." No strong evidence indicates that underwriters systematically
link premiums to driver dangerousness. 3 Even weaker is evidence that
motorists change their driving habits in response to premium rates.
Though safety-rating is not a strong response to the lost-deterrence
critique of no-fault, a stronger response exists-that the tort system does
not substantially deter unsafe driving in the first place.2 4 If the deterrent
effect of tort liability is weak, little is lost in moving to no-fault. Some
studies suggest that tort plays a substantial role in deterring auto negli-
gence. Other studies indicate that tort's deterrent effect is weak. Analy-
sis of the debate on this point is set out below.
If tort has little effect in reducing accident rates, it is not difficult to
22. See JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 131 (1989).
23. But see Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance-The
Empirical Evidence, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 117, 126-27 (1973) (noting that underwriters successfully
focus high premiums on bad drivers).
24. See Howard Latin, No-Fault: To Be or Not To Be? When Drivers Sue Drivers: Exposing
the Myths Underlying Automobile Litigation, N.J. LAW. 24, Jan. 1995, at 30.
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grasp why: driving may not be the kind of activity upon which liability
can exert strong incentive effects. Tort liability's financial incentives
operate most powerfully on activities pursued with financial gain in
mind. Motoring is generally not such an activity. Key incentives for
safe driving include concern for safety of self, loved ones, and strangers;
desire to prove competence and mastery; desire to avoid the hassle of
accidents; and fear of losing driving privileges. Fear of tort liability
probably ranks well behind all these other safe-driving incentives, espe-
cially because motorists generally carry liability insurance to shield
themselves from having to pay tort judgments. If so, moving to a no-
fault system will leave adequately powerful safety incentives in place.
Not only is the effect of tort liability on driving habits weak, but the
relationship between driving habits and accidents is also attenuated.
Most auto carelessness has a low correlation with injury. Common
unsafe practices-excess speed, momentary lapses of attention, cheating
on traffic signals, failures to anticipate-rarely produce accidents.25 If
they did, they would not be so common. Nearly all drivers commit such
sins regularly, though not grievously, and rarely cause accidents. No
given motorist can greatly reduce his or her odds of an accident by
reducing such careless habits, though many accidents in general are
caused by them.26 This is because accidents are often caused by the
interplay of conditions with actions and decisions taken by several driv-
ers. Given this general low correlation between safety zeal and accident
avoidance, no safety incentives of any kind are likely to have a meaning-
ful impact on the majority of drivers-except perhaps drastic sanctions
for unsafe practices.2
A different analysis may, at first glance, seem warranted for egre-
giously reckless drivers. Their habits seem especially prone to deter-
rence, because they lie so far from the norm and could be altered easily
without great hardship or superhuman vigilance. But, this apparent sus-
ceptibility to deterrence is probably illusory. Young males and the ine-
briated, the two chief classes of deviantly bad drivers, are not likely to
respond to tort liability with safer driving, because their dangerous
behavior stems from impaired judgment from the start.28 Thus, it seems
unlikely that tort law substantially constrains the level of drunk driving
or young male recklessness. For these drivers, under either no-fault or
25. See id. at 29 (stating that "unlucky" circumstances, not bad driving, cause most accidents,
and that the common forms of negligence include tailgating, speeding, inattention, and fatigue).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 29-30.
28. See id. at 30 (opining that tort liability cannot make eighteen-year-olds more mature,
suppress hormonal impulses, or reverse the deterioration of elderly reflexes). The most prominent
class for automobile accidents is males under the age of twenty-five. See id.
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tort, meaningful deterrence can arise only if they risk forfeiture of driv-
ing privileges or other harsh sanctions, even if they have not yet caused
an accident.
One odd feature of this debate is the self-contradictory posture each
side may sometimes stake out. Defenders of tort who criticize no-fault
on lost-deterrence grounds contend that motorists respond to possible
tort liability with safer driving, but do not respond similarly to possible
premium hikes under no-fault. That makes no more sense than denying
that tort promotes safe driving while at the same time insisting that pre-
mium hikes under no-fault do. It makes equal sense to expect that either
fear of suits or fear of premiums will promote safe driving. In fact, for
motorists with liability insurance, fear of suits is pretty much the same
thing as fear of premium hikes, because tort judgments themselves will
be paid by underwriters. It would take solid empirical evidence to prove
that such minor financial stakes have a major impact on highway safety,
under either tort or no-fault.2 9
There is one likely respect in which experience rating may affect
safety-by inducing some high-risk motorists to drive less in order to
keep their premiums down. Though it may fail to affect individual driv-
ing habits, experience rating may improve the ratio of low-risk to high-
risk drivers on the road. This effect could operate under either tort or
no-fault and is, therefore, not a safety advantage for preferring either
system over the other.
Most discussion of injury prevention under no-fault focuses on
whether no-fault undermines deterrence by weakening incentives to
drive safely. An argument can be made, however, that no-fault actually
promotes injury prevention because, in a first-party coverage system,
underwriters will offer low premiums to motorists driving collision-safe
cars. They do this, of course, because safe cars reduce payout risks.
Underwriters can, therefore, compete by cutting costs to attract custom-
ers who drive safe cars. This safety incentive is missing under tort
where the damage pay-out goes to a third-party victim, not to the under-
writer's own customer.3 °
It is likely that safety premiums would indeed emerge on discrete
safety items, like air bags and anti-lock brakes, but unlikely that they
would reach more subtle design elements. Crashworthiness can be
sharply affected by even such minor design changes as occur year-to-
29. See Paul Zador & Adrian Lund, Re-Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on
Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RISK & INS. 226, 228-29 (1994).
30. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Commerce Comm.,
105th Cong. (July 17, 1997) (testimony of Andrew Tobias), available in 1997 WL 11235933, at
*3 [hereinafter Senate Hearing]; JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY 242 (1990).
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year within continuing models. 31 Gathering meaningful safety data on
such items is painstaking at best and nearly impossible for new
models .32
Though safe-car discounts could theoretically produce injury reduc-
tions, I have seen no study showing they do so in fact. There are reasons
to suspect they might not. Discounts would bring injury reductions only
if they strongly affect the number of motorists choosing air bags, anti-
lock breaks, crash-proof construction, and the like. The actual effect
may be small, however, because personal safety, not insurance cost, is
arguably the major motive for choosing protective features. In addition,
safety-indifferent motorists will not be tempted by premium discounts
which fail to offset the added costs of these optional safety features. In
short, safe-car discounts-nice as they are for those who get them-may
not have much impact on safe-car choices. Safety-minded motorists will
choose safety features even without discounts and safety-indifferent
ones will reject them, discounts or no.
IV. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE: Now You SEE IT, Now You DON'T
In addtion to deterrence, another key value attributed to tort law is
corrective justice: the fairness of exacting victim recompense from the
culpable party.33 With no-fault, corrective justice falls by the wayside,
and as a result, could be judged a serious loss, though not everyone
agrees. Concern over corrective justice strikes some as trivial and pre-
cious compared with tangible goals like compensation and deterrence.
However, why worry about corrective justice if no-fault can deliver
compensation more rationally than tort without sacrificing deterrence?
Moreover, no-fault proponents doubt whether auto tort law truly
represents corrective justice. The notion of corrective justice starts with
an image of injustice inflicted by the defendant upon the plaintiff.
Because the defendant is "guilty" and the plaintiff "innocent," and
because the defendant operated at the plaintiffs expense, he or she owes
the plaintiff. Liability "corrects" the injustice.
It is not clear that this model makes sense for typical auto acci-
dents. As suggested above, low-level auto negligence is ubiquitous.
The vast majority of accidents involve the large group of drivers with
low accident frequency. 34 Most motorists make driving mistakes fre-
31. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 30, at 242-43.
32. See id.
33. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 1288-96 (discussing corrective justice); see also Laura R.
Rose, A Choice Scam: Consider All the Alternatives to National No-Fault Insurance,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), July 28, 1997, at P5A.
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 98-99, 189-90 (1970).
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quently, once every two miles according to one study.35 Though negli-
gence is ubiquitous, the incidence of actual harm is highly random,
resembling "acts of God" in the selection of victims. Moreover, the
risks imposed are highly reciprocal. Typically, the victim is about as
"bad" a driver as the culprit. These aspects becloud the picture of auto
tort liability as a form of corrective justice. If there is little corrective
justice in auto tort law to start with, little is lost in moving to no-fault.
The corrective justice picture is also beclouded by insurance.
Underwriters, not negligent drivers, usually pay tort damages. All driv-
ers finance those payments through their premiums. Hence, payment
ultimately comes from the pockets of the driving public, including vic-
tims. The notion that payment goes to innocent victims from negligent
culprits is misguided. The negligent motorist becomes merely the moral
scapegoat in an insurance delivery system.
Nevertheless, anxiety over lost corrective justice cannot simply be
dismissed. Those who dismiss corrective justice concerns may hold a
simplistic conception of them. The link between liability and corrective
justice may be important, even if it is hazy and imperfect. Auto tort
liability is not the only area where negligence law's link to corrective
justice is hazy. In medical malpractice, for example, liability seldom
turns on the notion that the doctor has done an "injustice" to the injured
patient or is, so to speak, a "bad" doctor. Good doctors make mistakes
just as the best athletes do.
But when such a mistake harms another, there may be injustice in
failure to take responsibility for the mistake, even if "injustice" seems
too strong a word for the defendant's actions toward the plaintiff.
Hence, malpractice law may perform a corrective justice function, albeit
a weaker one than pronouncing upon good and evil. The analogy
between auto tort and medical malpractice can be pushed even further.
Consumers ultimately absorb the cost of medical malpractice damages,
because doctors will raise fees in order to pay insurance premiums. As
in auto tort, where the driving public collectively makes payments to
negligently injured members, the collective consumers of health care
wind up paying malpractice victims. Hence, the corrective justice func-
tion of tort seems essentially symbolic for both auto tort law and medi-
cal malpractice. Both systems identify mistakes and attribute
responsibility to culpable parties, though the victim's compensation
comes not from the culprit but from elsewhere.
35. See id. at 171-88; LESLIE GEORGE NORMAN, ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS-EPIDEMIOLOGY,
CONTROL AND PREVENTION 51 (World Health Org. 1962) (estimating that the average driver
makes mistakes every two miles, causing near-collision every 500 miles, collision every 61,000
miles, personal injury every 430,000 miles, and a fatality every sixteen million miles).
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If corrective justice becomes purely symbolic, its value lies only in
ritual assessments of responsibility. Such assessments delineate and for-
tify a sense of moral order by identifying how and by whom damage has
been done. This may be meaningful to victims and other concerned par-
ties, though it serves no instrumental function. An American Bar Asso-
ciation report notes that "the tort system provides an important
psychological outlet for seriously injured victims who would be dissatis-
fied with 'no-fault' benefits and desirous of an impartial hearing of their
substantive case."36 To devalue tort law on the grounds that its correc-
tive justice role is inconsequential or vestigial may ignore subtle but
important concerns and experiences.
Still, it might be argued that corrective justice is especially over-
rated when it comes to auto tort law. A driver's negligence-as
opposed to bad luck-seems less "responsible" for a given accident
injuiry than a doctor's negligence is for medical mishaps. If so, the
blame game may be misplaced or downright harmful. On the other
hand, tort suits do allow fact-finders to weigh doubts about assigning
responsibility. Such deliberations can be performed on a flexible case-
by-case basis. But where no-fault prevails, all regularized inquest into
responsibility for accidents is banished.
Is the symbolic corrective justice of auto negligence law worth all
its lawyer fees and litigation costs? Such funds could be channeled into
broader and/or deeper compensation, or be saved through premium
reduction. Do all victims of harmful negligence have a "right" to cor-
rective justice? In states that have adopted no-fault, some polls show
majority support for a return to tort.37 Such polls may reveal frustration
with continuing high premiums under no-fault. But they may also reveal
a moral sense that corrective justice for negligence is valuable, even if
the negligence in question is as pervasive as auto carelessness is, impli-
cating everyone, and even if corrective justice is costly.
V. TYPES OF EXISTING No-FAULT SCHEMES
Although no state has ever enacted a pure no-fault system, three
states-Michigan, New York, and Florida-have adopted schemes
which eliminate substantial proportions of auto tort suits. Though they
are technically "partial" no-fault, these schemes approximate "pure" no-
fault. Michigan's scheme comes closest to pure no-fault.38 It bars suits
36. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT
LAW (1984) [hereinafter TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY].
37. See id. at 11-15 to 11-17.
38. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135 (West 1997).
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for economic damages, except those intentionally inflicted under a nar-
row definition of intention. 39 It bars pain and suffering suits except for
harm that is exceedingly serious or intentionally-inflicted.4 °
Partial and pure no-fault schemes can be compared with each other
and with traditional tort systems still operating in many states. All three
systems-partial no-fault, pure no-fault, and tort-can further be com-
pared with new "choice" proposals that allow motorists to choose
between a pre-existing tort or partial no-fault scheme on the one hand,
and an alternative scheme closer to pure no-fault, on the other hand.4'
Partial no-fault schemes provide first-party compensation for eco-
nomic loss, up to the limits of coverage purchased, without proof of
fault.42 A few also compensate for noneconomic damages (e.g., pain
and suffering), but most do not. Some, but not all, eliminate the right to
sue for economic damages to the extent such damages are covered by
no-fault benefits. Schemes that do not eliminate such suits usually let
first-party insurers who make pay-outs to victims claim subrogation
rights over tort judgments awarded to those same victims. This prevents
double recovery by victims and discourages them from bringing tort
suits, because damages from suits have to be paid to insurers as reim-
bursement for benefits paid.
Partial schemes ban pain and suffering claims for minor injuries,
but allow them for major ones. All allow suits for death and egregious
injury. They differ in how minor an injury can be and still be major
enough for lawsuit eligibility.
Two different systems or types of thresholds exist for separating
major from minor injuries. One is a "verbal" threshold, which descrip-
tively defines injuries eligible for law suits-for example, broken bones,
"permanent serious disfigurement," or "significant and permanent loss
of an important bodily function."43 The other type of threshold is "mon-
etary," a minimum dollar amount of medical damages.' Hence,
depending on the type of threshold and on whether economic damages
are entirely excluded from tort, there can be several major types of par-
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1977, S. 625, 105th Cong.
42. Five types of benefits are typically available: (1) lost income or earning capacity; (2)
value of victim's lost services to family; (3) medical and rehabilitative expenses; (4) lost earnings
a decedent would have provided to survivors; and (5) funeral costs. See ROBERT H. JERRY II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 132 (2d ed. 1996).
43. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REV.
1016, 1018 (1993) (quoting STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., No FAULT APPROACHES TO
COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTO ACCIDENTS 6 n.14 (RAND Inst. for Civ. Justice 1991)).
See also Swope, supra note 3.
44. See Swope, supra note 3.
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tial no-fault schemes. Partial no-fault schemes that most fully eliminate
the tort option for economic damages and place a high threshold for suits
for non-economic damages approximate pure no-fault. Currently, Mich-
igan, New York, and Florida have no-fault systems of this type.45
VI. EVALUATION OVERVIEW
The most significant no-fault experiences to date have been with
"partial" schemes which continue to allow tort suits for certain damages.
There is now enough experience with such schemes to allow meaning-
ful, though tentative, assessment. To compare no-fault meaningfully
with traditional tort, one would ideally assess each major type with
respect to at least four major factors: (1) rationality and efficiency in
delivering compensation; (2) success in deterrence; (3) fidelity -to values
of corrective justice; and (4) effect on low-income motorists. No study
has attempted such a thorough evaluation, but less comprehensive evalu-
ations have been offered, based unavoidably on incomplete information
and debatable value judgments.
Attempts to evaluate no-fault have focused on compensation and
deterrence. With respect to compensation, the controversy centers less
upon the observed effects of no-fault than upon how they should be
evaluated from the standpoint of wise public policy. With respect to
deterrence, by contrast, the empirical controversy is thick, focusing on
whether no-fault leads to increased highway danger. With respect to
corrective justice, controversy over no-fault remains purely normative,
focusing on the value and tangibility of corrective justice as delivered by
auto tort litigation and how corrective justice should be weighed against
compensation goals which may be better served by abandoning it.
VII. NO-FAULT AS A COMPENSATION SYSTEM
In general, studies have found existing no-fault schemes superior to
tort for rational and efficient delivery of compensation.4 6 This is unsur-
prising, since the chief inspiration for no-fault is the deficiency of tort as
a compensation system. It would be strange if no-fault, designed specif-
ically to meet compensation goals alone, failed to excel in meeting those
45. See Robert Schwaneberg, Jersey's Top Car Rates Are No Accident, STAR LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 5, 1997, at 1; see also Swope, supra note 3; Senate Hearing, supra note 30.
Hawaii's legislature recently passed a bill to enact such a scheme, but it fell to the governor's
veto. See Susanne Sclafane, 1997 A Bust for State Auto Insurance Reforms, but Pluses Emerge,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFIT MGMT., Aug. 11, 1997, at 3, available
in 1997 WL 9332086.
46. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-




goals compared with tort, where compensation goals are compromised
by additional and partially competing goals like deterrence and correc-
tive justice. On the other hand, there are several ambiguities in evaluat-
ing whether no-fault indeed exceeds tort in compensation rationality and
efficiency.
Before exploring those ambiguities, it is worthwhile to itemize the
different ways in which no-fault seems to successfully serve rationality
and efficiency in compensation.
No-Fault Pays a Higher Proportion of Premium Income to Claim-
ants Than Do Tort Systems. For each premium dollar, no-fault states
deliver 50.2 cents in victim benefits, while tort states deliver only 43.2
cents.47 Again, this is no surprise, because a goal of no-fault is to reduce
the drain of premium dollars into lawyer fees and other litigation costs.
Because most existing no-fault schemes are partial, the figures above
understate the potential premium savings of no-fault. Under pure no-
fault, the savings on fees and costs would almost certainly be higher and
a larger gap would open between no-fault and tort states in the delivery
of premium dollars to victims.
No-Fault Delivers Auto Insurance Compensation to More Accident
Victims Than Does Tort. Compared with tort, many more victims
receive auto insurance compensation under no-fault. Estimates for the
increase range between roughly 25% and roughly 100%. 48 This is
expected, since a basic purpose of no-fault is to widen the delivery of
compensation by removing proof of some adverse party's fault as a pre-
requisite to compensation.
No-Fault Reduces Over- and Under-Compensation. Under no-
fault, compensation delivered matches economic damages-mainly
medical expenses and lost income-more closely than under tort.49 This
unsurprising result stems from two chief factors. First, no-fault plans
focus on compensating economic losses and on curtailing compensation
for pain and suffering. Second, no-fault delivers compensation with far
less delay and strategic maneuvering between adverse litigants.
No-Fault Delivers Compensation More Quickly Than Does Tort.
One year after filing notice of their claim, no-fault claimants have
received, on average, over 95% of all they will ever receive, while most
47. See id. at 83.
48. See AIS RISK CONSULTANTS, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 26,
27 (May 1, 1997); see also COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 46, at 73
(estimating that almost twice as many accident victims are compensated under no-fault as under
tort).
49. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., No-FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED
IN AUTO ACCIDENTS (RAND Inst. for Civ. Justice 1991).
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tort claimants have received less than 52%.10 This comes as no surprise,
because no-fault avoids the delays of tort litigation by handling compen-
sation as a simple insurance claim matter.
No-Fault Cuts the Number of Lawsuits. Since barring suits is at the
heart of no-fault, this could scarcely fail to be true. Reduction in suits
depends, of course, on the degree of "purity" in no-fault plans. Aboli-
tion of no-fault restores higher lawsuit volume.'
Conclusions. No-fault successfully achieves some goals it is
designed to achieve. From this, one could conclude that no-fault
exceeds tort in compensation rationality and efficiency. But before
drawing that conclusion, several ambiguities need to be cleared up.
Existing no-fault has not brought reduced premiums, despite claims
by advocates that it should. If anything, premiums appear to be higher
in no-fault states than in traditional tort states, 52 despite savings on law-
yer fees and litigation costs. There are two main reasons. First, no-fault
compensates more people. Second, thresholds against tort suits have not
been high enough to prevent the continued frequent filing of suits.
5 3
Premiums in partial no-fault states reflect not only victim compensation,
but also the costs and lawyer fees associated with persistent tort litiga-
tion.54 Premiums could be reduced by moving toward pure no-fault.
55
This means reduced litigation costs and lawyers' fees.56 Of course, it
also means curtailed corrective justice. Though experience with partial
no-fault suggests a slight average hike in premiums compared with tort
states, this could be viewed as a good bargain, because premiums under
no-fault are paying for compensation to far more victims. But what
50. See COMPENSATING AUTro ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 46, at 79; ROBERT H. JOOST,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 3.22 (2d ed. 1992).
51. See Schwaneberg, supra note 45.
52. See COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 46, at 67-72; see also Hailey,
supra note 4 (noting that when Connecticut repealed no-fault, rates dropped 9.7%). Hailey notes
that eight of the ten highest-premium states are no-fault. See id. This point may prove less than it
seems. Though Hailey suggests that states have high premiums because they have no-fault, they
might have high premiums even without it. High rates may explain why states adopt no-fault in
the first place.
53. See J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs, 6 J.
EcON. PERSP. 95, 110-I1 (1992); STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., THE COSTS OF EXCESS MEDICAL
CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (RAND Inst. For Civ. Justice 1995).
54. One perspective on partial no-fault is that its existence and flaws can be blamed on trial
lawyers who resisted enactments of pure no-fault. In the words of one no-fault proponent: "The
trial lawyers have basically shot no-fault in the foot and now they complain that it limps." Swope,
supra note 3 (quoting law professor Jeffrey O'Connell).
55. W. PAGE KEETON & ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
804-05 (2d ed. 1977).
56. The few pain and suffering suits exceeding the severe injury threshold in New York




seems like a bargain may trouble consumers concerned only with keep-
ing their own premiums down. They may not care that hiked premiums
under no-fault provide them guaranteed compensation for auto accident
injury. Given a choice, many might waive guaranteed compensation in
return for lower premiums. If so, no-fault undermines rationality and
efficiency by delivering more compensation than people truly value.
The tort fault system is, therefore, arguably better.
Consumer-choice arguments of this sort are a staple in law-and-
economics analysis of liability and insurance issues. Because such argu-
ments imagine a world where efficiency and rationality lie exclusively in
individualized consumer choice, they ultimately yield proposals to ban-
ish all liability law and compulsory insurance, replacing both with a sys-
tem of optional first-party insurance, purchased in whatever amounts
motorists choose. That way, consumers do not pay for indemnification
they would not freely buy. Though there are many reasons to view such
arguments skeptically, they cannot be dismissed out of hand. Choice
and willingness to pay are undeniably pertinent to economic conceptions
of rationality and efficiency. It might be rational to reject no-fault due to
an unwillingness to pay for expanded coverage, even though the existing
tort system, with mutually offsetting third-party coverage among motor-
ists due to mandatory insurance requirements, in effect, also requires
motorists to pay for coverage they might not willingly purchase.
On the other hand, moving from partial to pure no-fault might cur-
tail opposition to expanded forced coverage by reducing its cost. Tort,
pure no-fault, and partial no-fault can be viewed as alternative regimes
of forced coverage, with variations and trade-offs as to premium levels
and types and scope of coverage. Evaluation from the standpoint of
consumer free choice is elusive. The simplest analysis would be that
consumer free choice is offended least by the system that costs least in
forced premiums. Pure no-fault, which shrinks lawsuit costs and com-
pensation for pain and suffering most radically, may feature the lowest
premiums, and hence, the greatest consumer free choice from that stand-
point. But this analysis is tentative. It may be simple to think that con-
sumer choice is most favored by the system that charges the least. The
charges imposed by the different systems pay for different packages of
benefits. Attempting to rank the systems on how well they serve con-
sumer choice makes no more sense than ranking apples against oranges.
Two potential fronts for premium reduction under partial no-fault
are: (1) better curtailment of tort suits for economic damages, and (2)
stringent thresholds against tort suits for pain and suffering damages. In
partial no-fault states that currently allow tort suits for economic dam-
ages, lawsuit curtailment can, of course, be achieved by switching to a
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system that bars them. States that bar economic damage suits do so only
when such damages do not exceed first-party coverage levels. Where
such levels are low, the number and cost of tort suits are high, because it
is easy for damages to exceed them. Hence, overall premium reduction
would be served by mandating high first-party coverage minimums so as
to preclude more of the tort suits that drive premiums upward.5 7 Michi-
gan goes the next step by banning all auto tort suits for economic dam-
ages, except for harm intentionally caused under a narrow definition,
while providing unlimited medical and rehabilitation benefits to injury
victims, along with substantial wage loss protection.58 Premiums in
Michigan are low as a result.59
Thresholds have proved weak in preempting tort suits under partial
no-fault. Monetary thresholds have proved especially ineffective. They
have been far too low to succeed in blocking tort suits.6" Plaintiffs, law-
yers, and medical providers combine to produce damages claims high
enough to exceed threshold amounts. Consequently, cases of fraud may
rise.6 When Massachusetts raised its threshold from $500 to $2,000 in
1988, average medical visits rocketed from thirteen to thirty per claim.62
In Hawaii, which had a high $7,000 threshold in 1990,63 the median
number of chiropractor visits among those tort claimants who saw a chi-
ropractor was fifty-eight per injury.64 Monetary thresholds also fall
behind inflation.
65
Verbal thresholds requiring serious injury in order to proceed in tort
have had greater success in preempting tort suits. Some verbal thresh-
olds are too lax on their face to preempt enough tort suits to generate
real savings. New Jersey's weak threshold, for example, speaks of frac-
tures and disfigurement.6 6 Michigan's, by contrast, is stringent enough
57. See Senate Hearing, supra note 30.
58. See id.; MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.3135 (West 1997).
59. See id.
60. In 1991, monetary thresholds varied from Connecticut's low at $400 to Hawaii's high at
$7,600. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 49, at 6 n.15, 29 n.I.
61. See Senate Hearing, supra note 30; see also AUTO CHOICE REFORM ACT, SUMMARY
(1997) (on file with author); see also Sarah S. Marter & Herbert I. Weisberg, Medical Expenses
and the Massachusetts Automobile Tort Reform Law: A First Review of 1989 Bodily Injury
Liability Claims, 10 J. INS. REG. 462, 488 tbl. 12 (1992); LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING
CONTINGENCY FEES 32-33 (Manhattan Inst. 1994); Efrain Hernandez, Jr., Ring in Somerville
Indicted for Filing False Auto Claims, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1992, at 58; James H. Andrews,
No-Fault Insurance Faulted as Some States Move to Drop It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 26,
1994, at 3.
62. See Marter & Weisberg, supra note 61.
63. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTOMOBILE INJURY CLAIMS IN HAWAII 29 (1991).
64. See id. at 26 Hol. 38.
65. See ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE
INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 13-14 (1989) (now known as the Insurance Research Council).
66. See Schwaneberg, supra note 45.
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to preempt the bulk of tort suits. It speaks of "death, serious impairment
of body function, [and] permanent serious disfigurement. 67 Michigan
limits litigation costs further by treating "permanent serious disfigure-
ment" and "serious impairment of body function" as issues of law for
courts to decide where there is no factual dispute over the actual nature
of the injuries. 68  New Jersey's high premiums compared with Michi-
gan's stem partly from these differences.69
Even strong verbal thresholds may succumb to "slippage," whereby
tort suits of less and less magnitude are allowed by courts to escape
preemption. This process cannot be forestalled unless thresholds are
stiff and strictly enforced. New York's threshold, for example, is fairly
stringent, but may, nevertheless, succumb to slippage.7° If thresholds
are truly stringent, the difference between partial and pure no-fault nar-
rows. At that point, any special virtues of partial over pure no-fault lose
relevance, and any preference for partial over pure becomes weak.
VIII. No-FAULT AND DETERRENCE
With respect to deterrence, the crucial question is whether no-fault
is inferior to tort. Conclusions on lost deterrence-increased accidents
due to decreased care in driving-are mixed. The issue has been hotly
contested in a series of studies reaching various results. At this point, no
firm conclusion can be drawn on whether no-fault produces higher acci-
dent rates, and if so, why or how much. What follows is a brief review
of several of the significant studies and issues.
In one early study, Elizabeth M. Landes looked at auto fatality rates
for the 1967-76 period, running a regression analysis designed to isolate
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(1) (West 1997). Florida and New York are the two
other states with stringent verbal thresholds. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) (West 1984);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(d) (McKinney 1985).
Florida's threshold is slightly weaker than Michigan's, because its categories for allowing
suits are broader. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) (allowing suits for "permanent injury" and
"significant and permanent scarring"). New York, in turn, is slightly less rigorous than Florida
using terms such as "fracture," "significant disfigurement," and "injury or impairment of a non-
permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the
material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than
ninety days immediately following the occurrence." N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(d). Compare with
Michigan's standard of "permanent serious disfigurement," MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3135(1), and Florida's standard of "significant and permanent disfigurement." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.737(2).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(2)(a).
69. See Schwaneberg, supra note 45; see also Swope, supra note 3 (looser thresholds
generally increase litigation and premiums); Senate Hearing, supra note 30 (same).
70. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 5102(d); see also INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, INC., TRENDS IN
AUTO INJURY CLAIMS (2d ed. 1995).
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the impact of no-fault." She concluded that at a $1,500 lawsuit thresh-
old, fatal accidents would rise 10% over what would happen under
tort.
72
Landes' study was hotly criticized by O'Connell and Levmore. 73
They chide failure to control for such variables as weather, police
enforcement, road quality, driver training, urban-rural differences, and
medical care. It was also criticized for focusing on fatalities, not injuries
generally, and its implicit assumption that motorists will ignore their
own safety, increasing their recklessness due to no-fault's protection
against tort suits. 74 All of these criticisms seem well-taken except for
the focus-on-fatalities point. The critics puzzlingly suggest that a fatali-
ties hike proves nothing about any difference between tort and no-fault,
because tort recovery for fatalities remains available anyway under all
state no-fault plans. But if no-fault's reduced exposure to tort liability
makes drivers more reckless, an increase in fatalities is very much what
one could expect, even if fatalities remain subject to tort suits under no-
fault. Of course, this is not to say that Landes has indeed proved that
curtailing tort will in fact cause increased recklessness.
Zador and Lund castigate Landes not for her choice of variables,
but for her statistical analysis. Using more adequate statistical methods
and a more comprehensive data set, they find no link between no-fault
and increased highway fatalities.7 Kochanowski and Young find like-
wise. A U.S. Department of Transportation study comparing no-fault
with tort states, found no statistically significant difference in highway
fatalities or injuries.76
Sloan, on the other hand, estimates that a no-fault system that bars
25% of potential suits hikes fatalities 18% over what would happen
under tort.7 7 That figure seems implausibly high on its face, and Sloan
warns about possible limitations in the data. Nevertheless, he contends
that tort exerts a powerful safety effect, though not upon young
drivers .
Medoff and Magaddino find that loss ratios in no-fault states are
71. See Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation of the Effects of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 62 (1982).
72. See id.
73. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell & Saul Levmore, A Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of
No-Fault's Effect on Fault?, 48 Mo. L. Rav. 649 (1983).
74. See id. at 650-51.
75. See Zador & Lund, supra note 29, at 234-35; see also P.S. Kochanowski & Madelyn K.
Young, Deterrent Aspects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings, 52 J.
RISK & INS. 269, 286-87 (1985).
76. See COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS, supra note 46, at 159-66.
77. See Sloan, supra note 19, at 66.
78. See id. at 66-69.
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higher than in tort states by 3.9 to 7.4 percent, depending upon degrees
of purity in different no-fault plans.79 A loss ratio is essentially the pro-
portion of premium dollars paid out on claims.8" From higher loss
ratios, the authors deduce that no-fault states have higher accident
rates.81 There are serious problems with this deduction, however,
because higher loss ratios could stem from factors other than increased
accidents. The authors offer data negating possibilities that average
claim size goes up under no-fault or that no-fault states had higher aver-
age accident rates prior to enactment of no-fault.82 But there are two
other hypotheses they fail to rule out.
One is that no-fault will show higher loss ratios if it brings lower
average premiums. Since loss ratios are inversely proportional to premi-
ums, premium reductions yield loss ratio increases if loss levels remain
constant. The authors point out that premiums were indeed lower under
no-fault than under tort during the period they studied. Though the mag-
nitude of premium reductions reasonably matches that of the increased
loss ratios under no-fault, the authors fail to consider a causal
relationship.83
They also fail to consider that the number of paid claims may rise
under no-fault not because accidents increase, but because claims are
paid on a higher proportion of them. Under no-fault, victims get paid by
filing first-party claims, not by filing lawsuits where fault must be pled
and ultimately proved before the adversary's underwriter will pay any-
thing. If the ratio of paid claims to accidents will be higher with no-fault
than with tort, loss ratios will increase correspondingly. That is exactly
the pattern observed.84
Studies abroad match the equivocal pattern of U.S. studies. Two
Canadian studies, one by Gaudry and one by Devlin, observe that
reported highway injuries and fatalities rose sharply after Quebec
enacted no-fault in 1978.85 But particular features of the Quebec reform
must be inspected before drawing conclusions. For one thing, Quebec's
79. See generally Marshall H. Medoff & Joseph P. Magaddino, An Empirical Analysis of No-
Fault Insurance, 6 EVALUATION REV. 373 (1982).
80. See id. at 390 n.8.
81. See id. at 378-88.
82. See id. at 383-84.
83. See id. at 382, 386.
84. See id. at 382.
85. See Marc Gaudry, Measuring the Effects of the No-Fault 1978 Quebec Automobile
Insurance Act With the Drag Model, in CONTRIBUTIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS 471 (1991);
Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of the
Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499, 513-14 (1992)
[hereinafter Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault]. See also Rose Anne Devlin, Some Welfare
Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 10 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 193, 202 (1990)
[hereinafter Devlin, Welfare Implications[.
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reform installed a public first-party compensation fund charging the
same premium to all motorists. Premiums are neither experience-rated
for individual drivers nor adjusted for high-risk group factors, such as
young male status.86 This reduces premiums sharply for high-risk driv-
ers, young males for example, drawing many who found driving previ-
ously unaffordable onto the highways or else converting low-mileage
high-risk drivers to higher mileage.
Highway danger rises, to be sure, but due to increased motoring by
high-risk drivers, not by decreasing individual care levels.87 This may
turn entirely on flat premium schedules, not on no-fault as such. And
even if it is true that lack of experience rating brings increased individ-
ual carelessness, this proves nothing about no-fault as such, because no-
fault can be combined with experience rating. Existing and proposed
U.S. no-fault plans leave underwriting to private firms and forswear flat
premium schedules. This stifles at least one dimension of increased
highway danger.
If no-fault successfully brings average premiums down compared
with tort, that itself may bring about an increase in miles driven and a
consequent rise in accidents. This could also be part of the story in
Quebec.88 Again, this does not mean that individual care levels have
declined. It would be strange to view increased accident rates as a dis-
advantage of no-fault if the reason is entirely that no-fault, by bringing
down the insurance cost of driving, encourages people to drive more.
Driving more at less cost should count as an advantage of no-fault, not a
disadvantage, even if it means more injuries, unless some optimum
injury level or tradeoff with miles driven can somehow be specified.
Auto injuries can be reduced to zero if no one drives at all, but that
hardly counts as optimal.
Despite such problems, Devlin insists that Quebec's fatality hike
under no-fault must stem from reduced care in driving.89 But this insis-
tence has no discernible scientific foundation and seems to rest entirely
on the implausible conjecture that people take more risks with their own
bodily safety if they are guaranteed injury compensation regardless of
their own fault levels.
Devlin's study is further flawed by failure to investigate whether
increased accident levels might be due to higher auto volume and traffic
density in the years after enactment of no-fault. She concedes that iso-
86. See Gaudry, supra note 85, at 481-83.
87. Cf. Michael J. Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in the Design of 'No-Fault' Compensation
Systems, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19, 29-30 (1989) (finding individual care levels decrease); Devlin,
Liability Versus No-Fault, supra note 85, at nn.12, 19; Gaudry, supra note 85.
88. See Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault, supra note 85, at n.12.
89. See id. at 513-14.
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lating the level of care as explanation for accident levels requires con-
trolling for miles driven and perhaps for vehicular volume.90 Unreliable
data on miles driven prevent her from controlling for that factor. She
acknowledges this and purports to deploy analytic techniques to mini-
mize the problem,91 but she is less than convincing in this regard.
She could use vehicular volume, where the data are far more relia-
ble, to help isolate the level of care variable. Her responses to this do
not inspire confidence. First, she notes that number of vehicles may be a
poor proxy for miles driven, because it does not indicate how many
miles vehicles get driven.92 This is true, but is of questionable rele-
vance. Even with an arbitrarily-assigned figure for miles per vehicle (to
reduce, at least partly, the effect of uncertain underlying data on miles
driven) or no assumption at all (treating increased vehicular volume as
an independent, stand-alone possible cause of accident increases), con-
trolling for vehicular volume is better than not doing so.
Devlin seems to acknowledge this when she reports that she did
control for vehicular volume in the earliest version of her study. Though
she claims that doing so yields results consistent with the causal connec-
tion she draws between no-fault and increased fatality, she provides no
details.93 Credence is under some strain by this point.
Devlin does not even consider increased traffic density as a possi-
ble cause of increased accident rates. Density in some areas may rise
faster than the general increase in vehicular volume, and increased den-
sity may produce exponential or discontinuous jumps in accident rates.
Moreover, it would make sense that flat premiums could produce dispro-
portionately increased road use in urban areas where market-set rates are
normally higher than in rural areas. Hence, road use can be expected to
rise in precisely those areas where density is already highest. The result-
ing accident increase has nothing to do with individual care levels or
with no-fault, and everything to do with flat premiums and their effect
on road use.
In a New Zealand study, Brown finds that enactment of no-fault
there produced no adverse safety effect.94 Accident, injury, and fatality
rates actually declined after the onset of no-fault, due to stiffened laws
and enforcement on motorcycle helmets, seat-belts, and drunk driving.95
These factors make it difficult to isolate no-fault's effect on driving hab-
90. See id. at 510-11, 517 n.18.
91. See id. at 510-11.
92. See id. at 517 n.18.
93. See id.
94. See Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73
CAL. L. REV. 976 (1985).
95. See id. at 994-1001.
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its. Absence of multi-variable statistical analysis weakens the value of
Brown's study.96 Nevertheless, the figures on convictions for alcohol-
unrelated recklessness and speeding do tell a story. They do not rise
with the enactment of no-fault.97
McEwin's study of no-fault in Australia and New Zealand finds
fatality hikes of 16% per driver.98 Like Quebec, however, Australian
and New Zealand no-fault utilizes flat premium structures that may draw
high-risk drivers onto the road more heavily. 99 Hasty conclusions about
the United States should not be drawn from such systems.
IX. NO-FAULT AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Corrective justice inherently defies empirical measurement or
study. Hence, any corrective justice comparison between tort and no-
fault schemes is ineffable. If pure no-fault abandons all corrective jus-
tice (because tort suits are thrown out entirely), comparing it with tort
quickly reduces to two questions: (1) how valuable is corrective justice;
and (2) how much does auto tort litigation embody it?
Comparisons grow even more ineffable when tort is compared with
partial no-fault, which retains vestiges of corrective justice, and when
partial no-fault is compared with pure no-fault. The comparisons
become ones between varying types and degrees of corrective justice.
How close to or far from the tort law "norm" for corrective justice do the
various partial no-fault schemes lie? How much does it matter? How
should any sacrifices in corrective justice be weighed against gains in
compensation rationality and efficiency? Can meaningful corrective jus-
tice be reconciled with substantial gains in compensation rationality and
efficiency?
X. "CHOICE" NO-FAULT: THE SIMPLE VERSION
Current assessments of no-fault are further complicated by propos-
als for so-called "choice" no-fault plans. Under the simplest choice
scheme, each motorist would opt either for a type of no-fault coverage
or for retention of whatever tort lawsuit rights, full or partial, exist prior
to enactment of the choice scheme. First-party no-fault recovery, called
PIP (personal injury protection) or PPI (personal protection insurance),
is for economic damages up to the coverage limit, with tort suits for
economic damages allowed only when they exceed the limit. Suits for
96. See Trebilcock, supra note 87, at 29.
97. See Brown, supra note 94, at 1000-01.
98. See R. IAN McEwIN, No-FAULT AND ROAD ACCIDENTS: SOME AUSTRALASIAN EVIDENCE,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE SOCIETY 185-93 (1987).
99. See Trebilcock, supra note 87, at 29.
[Vol. 52:793
NO-FAULT DRIVES AGAIN
pain and suffering are barred. Motorists opting for PIP receive first-
party coverage for economic losses, but not for pain and suffering, and
waive all tort suits for pain and suffering. They also receive immunity
from suits for pain and suffering damages. In effect, they waive their
right to seek compensation for pain and suffering they may experience in
return for immunity from pain and suffering they may inflict.
The appeal of choice is to offer motorists the option of no-fault's
projected low premiums and ensure compensation without forcing it on
anyone who prefers tort's corrective justice and higher possible recov-
eries. A choice system purportedly offers the compensation advantages
of no-fault to those who choose the no-fault option. Like other systems
discussed above, choice plans present issues of compensation rationality
and efficiency, effectiveness in deterrence, and fidelity to values of cor-
rective justice. Empirical evaluation is hampered, because actual experi-
ence with choice is even more limited than that with pure no-fault.
Choice proponents predict substantial premium reductions for
motorists who select no-fault. 0 Since this is the proposal's main pur-
pose, this prediction is unsurprising. By removing pain and suffering,
lawyer fees, and litigation costs from the compensation system for no-
fault insureds, the scheme is able to offer them reduced premiums. Par-
ticipants get reduced premiums, guaranteed compensation without proof
of fault, and immunity from suits for pain and suffering in exchange for
waiving access to pain and suffering damages. Though this assertedly
achieves superior rationality and efficiency in compensation, pain and
suffering damages must be sacrificed in order to obtain no-fault's advan-
tages. This upends no-fault's claim to economic superiority. In techni-
cal economic terms: there is no free lunch.
For those who choose the no-fault option under a simple choice
plan, results compare to what one could expect from a pure no-fault plan
that bars compensation for pain and suffering. Meanwhile, those opting
for tort under a simple choice plan can expect premiums to remain basi-
cally as they were under the pre-existing tort or partial no-fault systems,
because accident risks and litigation expenses would not change much.
Minor changes might occur, because for accidents between defendants
under PIP and plaintiffs under tort, pain and suffering indemnity would
come from first-party coverage, known as tort maintenance coverage,
not from adversary lawsuits as under tort or partial no-fault. This differ-
ence could affect average premiums paid by tort-system motorists.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania have recently enacted simple choice
systems. They basically allow motorists to choose between partial no-
100. See sources cited supra note 61.
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fault coverage and the traditional tort system.' 0 ' New Jersey's recently
re-elected governor, Christin Todd Whitman, now advocates a more
complex plan, offering four choices: nearly-pure no-fault; partial no-
fault with verbal thresholds; no-fault with first-party pain and suffering
coverage; and traditional tort.' 0 2 Astonishingly enough, auto insurance
rates were a leading issue in the gubernatorial campaign.
XI. THE CONGRESSIONAL CHOICE INITIATIVE:
"NEO-PARTIAL" NO-FAULT
In the Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, Congress considered a
plan different in one crucial respect from the simple choice plan
described above. Under the Congressional choice plan, all motorists,
whether covered under PIP or under tort maintenance, could sue for pain
and suffering where the injuring driver was under the influence of drugs
or alcohol or engaged in intentional misconduct. 03 This exception to
no-fault preemption of pain and suffering suits separates the Congres-
sional plan from the simple choice scheme. Essentially, the Congres-
sional plan substitutes a severity-of-misconduct threshold to pain and
suffering suits for the severity-of-injury thresholds found in partial no-
fault schemes. Hence, the Congressional plan could be called "neo-par-
tial" no-fault.
A plan recently rejected by Louisiana lawmakers featured two
alternate partial no-fault thresholds to pain and suffering suits-a tradi-
tional verbal severe-injury threshold and a neo-partial severe-miscon-
duct threshold. In theory, neo-partial no-fault could exist with or
without choice. Because previous versions of choice no-fault have not
featured this severe-misconduct loophole, their PIP coverage is closer to
pure no-fault. 0
A threshold to pain and suffering suits based on severe misconduct
rather than severe injury preserves the most morally compelling core of
corrective justice-pain and suffering compensation from wanton
wrongdoers-while stripping away lawsuit opportunities based on
severe damage alone. It is not clear, however, how successful this mis-
conduct-based threshold system can be in preempting suits and bringing
rates down, since so many serious accidents are caused by drunk drivers.
101. See Thomas Martello, Sabrin's Auto Insurance Plan Copies Republican Senator's Bill,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Oct. 4, 1997 (discussing New Jersey's Choice System); Stephen
Carroll, Effects of a Choice Automobile Insurance Plan on Costs and Premiums: Testimony
Presented to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 105th Cong. (July 17,
1997) (on file with author); Sclafane, supra note 45.
102. See Sclafane, supra note 45.
103. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S. 625, 105th Cong. § 6(d).
104. See generally Swope, supra note 3.
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Projections of major premium cuts under the Congressional plan do not
consider how many suits will escape no-fault preemption due to drunk
defendants. Unless studies make such estimates reasonably, any savings
projections made are fanciful. Savings are in fact overestimated in the
most widely-cited study of the Congressional plan, because the number
and costs of drunk-driving suits have not been factored. 105 This is clear,
because the study projects the same premium cuts for the Congressional
choice plan as for a choice plan without the drunk-driver pain and suf-
fering threshold. 106
Information on drunk driving and accidents yields a rough measure
of savings overstatement in the study. One careful estimate is that alco-
hol causes roughly a quarter of all highway fatalities.107 If total highway
injuries correspond with fatalities, one fourth can be chalked up to drink-
ing. Alcohol's share of auto tort suits may well be much higher than its
share of auto injuries, because many injuries involve no negligence and
give rise to no lawsuit. One study found that only 37% of auto accident
victims who suffer economic loss receive a tort settlement."0 8 This sug-
gests that for a high proportion of injuries, no suit is filed. Furthermore,
alcohol-caused crashes may yield suits in higher proportion than crashes
caused by alcohol-unrelated negligence, because culpability for drinking
may be especially clear and provable. Judgments and settlements might
be higher, as well. At any rate, there is no question that an estimate
omitting the cost of drunk driving suits overstates savings by a consider-
able magnitude.
The Congressional plan dreams of major premium cuts while
retaining the crucial moral core of corrective justice. But that circle will
not square, precisely because drunk driving suits are key both to correc-
tive justice and to high costs and premiums. In terms of corrective jus-
tice, a misconduct-based threshold is superior to an injury-based one.
But preserving this heart of corrective justice requires losing a substan-
tial slice of potential cost cuts.
105. ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE EFFECTS OF A CHOICE AUTOMOBILE
PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS n.3 (RAND Inst. for Civ. Justice, Apr. 1997).
106. Compare id. (projecting savings from plan with misconduct threshold included), with
ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE EFFECTS OF A CHOICE AUTO INSURANCE
PLAN ON INSURANCE COSTS (RAND Inst. for Civ. Justice 1995) (projecting savings from plan
without misconduct threshold included).
107. See H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING
LIVES 37 (1992).
108. See CONARD ET AL., supra note 11, at 149.
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XII. CHOICE PLANS: MECHANICS, DYNAMICS, RESULTS,
AND VALUES
Under choice, PIP motorists waive their right to bring many tort
actions for auto negligence. In exchange, they receive partial immunity
from economic damage suits for their own negligence and complete or
neo-partial immunity from pain and suffering suits. It is this immunity,
combined with reduced premiums and assured partial compensation, that
induces motorists to waive their rights to bring suit.
Motorists who refuse this bargain retain rights to sue, but remain
subject to being sued under whatever tort or partial no-fault system
already exists in their state, and recover nothing for their injuries without
proving the adverse party's negligence. In accidents between two PIP
motorists, each receives first-party compensation. In accidents between
two tort system motorists, suits or settlements proceed as in the pre-
existing tort system, be it traditional or partial no-fault. However, there
is potential awkwardness in a choice plan when accidents occur between
motorists under no-fault and motorists under tort. Allowing suit by the
tort-system motorist would contradict the no-fault motorist's immunity;
hence, the right to sue must yield. Over time, this risk of having suits
thwarted by immunity may induce motorists who actually prefer tort to
choose no-fault instead. Otherwise, they could wind up paying high
tort-system premiums while losing effective exercise of the right to sue
they supposedly retain. Pressure on each motorist to choose no-fault
would increase as more and more others do. The "choice" aspect would
become illusory and the system would converge on no-fault for
everyone.' 0 9
This awkwardness is supposedly resolved by giving tort plaintiffs
who face immunized no-fault defendants an equivalent of tort recovery.
Such plaintiffs secure their tort-damage equivalent through first-party
claims against their own insurers in what is called "tort maintenance
coverage," with recovery up to the coverage amount conditioned on
proving negligence by the immunized defendant, even though the immu-
nized defendant will not make the actual payment.°"0 Thus, the no-fault
defendant retains his tort immunity, but the plaintiff secures the
equivalent of a tort recovery. The system is much like existing unin-
sured motorist coverage, whereby a claimant receives first-party cover-
109. Some indication of the likelihood of this scenario may be observed in New Jersey where,
under the current plan allowing choice between tort and partial no-fault, 88% percent of motorists
opt for partial no-fault. See Martello, supra note 101. It is impossible to say whether these
motorists are simply attracted to lower rates and guaranteed recoveries under partial no-fault or
whether they perceive the tort option as valueless, because so many other motorists have
immunity.
110. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S. 625, 105th Cong. §§ 4(20)-(21), 5(c), 6.
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age in lieu of tort compensation if a particular defendant lacks funds or
insurance to pay a judgment."' Tort claims against PIP insureds would
remain available for economic damages exceeding one's tort mainte-
nance coverage limit.
A system of litigating third-party negligence against first-party
underwriters under tort maintenance coverage might not last long.
Underwriters could cut litigation costs by offering no-fault recovery to
tort maintenance customers at rates more attractive than those for fault-
based coverage. This will occur if savings from avoiding negligence
litigation exceed the costs of increased numbers of payouts. Moreover,
it is predictable that underwriters will standardize damage payment
levels, including those for pain and suffering, according to pre-set sched-
ules, rather than "litigating" them before in-house "juries."
With these developments, it is likely that competitive forces will
then drive fault-based first-party coverage from the market, leaving a
tort maintenance system where motorists instead choose first-party no-
fault coverage at various levels for various rates. This could, in theory,
include a first-party market for pain and suffering coverage. But it is
likely that this market, in turn, will fail and that motorists will over-
whelmingly abandon pain and suffering coverage in pursuit of low pre-
miums. In other words, they will not buy tort maintenance coverage, but
will opt for PIP instead. A combination of market choices and market
breakdown will produce a regime of near pure no-fault for almost every-
one. Lawmakers considering voting for a so-called "choice" plan should
understand that voting for it may, in effect, mean voting for uniform no-
fault in the end.
When all is said and done, the resulting system will be akin to near-
pure no-fault for everyone, with pain and suffering compensation
squeezed out of the system, except under the Congressional plan, which
retains tort cases for egregious driving misconduct. The Congressional
plan might yield a decent system-no-fault first-party coverage for eco-
nomic losses, and corrective justice for pain and suffering, but only in
the most morally compelling situations. But the "choice" aspect will
have turned out to be a mirage. Under the Congressional plan, incentive
to choose PIP over tort maintenance coverage would be especially sharp,
because PIP motorists would retain the right to sue for pain and suffer-
ing in cases of egregious driver misconduct. Under such a system, PIP
seems the best of possible worlds. It may not, however, be a world of
drastically reduced premiums, because costly pain and suffering suits
will remain commmonplace.
111. See id. § 6(c).
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Proponents of choice might argue that if motorists choose to waive
pain and suffering coverage, it means they did not value it enough in the
first place to pay for it willingly. They are better off without it, and
better off without a system (tort) that makes them pay (with extra premi-
ums) for a good they do not truly value (the chance for pain and suffer-
ing compensation). This argument ignores the possibility that market
failure might thwart delivery of a good people truly value at prices
reflecting how much they value it.
There is strong reason to suspect that market failure would plague
first-party insurance for pain and suffering. Consumers would face pro-
hibitive information costs in estimating their chances of suffering pains
of various magnitudes. In other words, they would have no realistic way
of finding out how much pain and suffering coverage they should buy
and at what prices. A rational and functioning market for reasonable
amounts at reasonable prices would not emerge and consumers would go
uninsured instead, even though they might, in fact, deem compensation
for pain and suffering to be valuable." I2
If all this is true, a tort system that provides regular pain and suffer-
ing benefits might be superior from a consumer-welfare standpoint to a
no-fault system that constricts them. On the other hand, under the Con-
gressional plan, pain and suffering damages may remain adequately
available under the drunk-driving loophole. As noted, motorists with
this loophole available may strongly tend to opt for PIP coverage. If so,
that plan may achieve a defensible balance of widespread easy compen-
sation for economic losses, corrective justice, and an adequate level of
pain and suffering damages. What such a plan may not achieve is
sharply cutting premiums. In fact, premium hikes would not be
surprising.
Evaluating deterrence under choice plans is equally ambiguous. If
tort serves deterrence, choice plans undermine it to whatever degree
motorists opt out of tort into no-fault. In theory, the degree of lost deter-
rence in the switch from tort or partial no-fault to choice could be mea-
sured by careful analysis of accident rates. Because choice schemes
have not yet been widely adopted, no such study can yet be made. It is
doubtful that such studies would prove a connection between deterrence
and tort more convincing than studies so far have managed to do.
112. On the possibility of market failure in first-party insurance for pain and suffering
coverage, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995); see also Steven P. Croley
& Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 683, 770-79 (1993) (discussing similar market failures in the products liability context);
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent
Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 61-64 (1990) (same).
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Corrective justice comparisons are again ineffable. Corrective jus-
tice can be "quantified" by the proportion of auto accidents in which
some third-party settlement or judgment takes place. Under simple
choice, the overall "quantum" of corrective justice is more than under
pure no-fault if many motorists retain lawsuit rights, but less than under
traditional tort, because many will waive such rights. How much more
and less is a matter of how many motorists retain their lawsuit option.
The more motorists choose to retain lawsuit rights, the more the system
retains tort's purported corrective justice dimension. As noted above,
waiver of tort rights is likely to be high if underwriters begin offering
tort maintenance coverage as a form of optional no-fault indemnity for
pain and suffering. The Congressional plan, with its severe misconduct
tort threshold, would nevertheless retain a substantial measure of correc-
tive justice, arguably in precisely those cases where it is most proper and
meaningful.
When tort and no-fault motorists collide under choice plans, correc-
tive justice takes a back seat. Claimants secure full tort-like compensa-
tion, but it comes from underwriters, not from negligent motorists.
Determining culprit negligence may turn out to be more costly for
underwriters than covering claimant losses on a no-fault basis. If so,
negligence determinations may grow rare, supplanted by no-fault indem-
nity offerings. Even if determining culprit negligence remains a prereq-
uisite to payment, this dim echo of corrective justice would lose moral
significance, because negligent culprits would not be party to proceed-
ings and the compensation would not be linked to them even by
insurance.
A corrective justice comparison between choice and existing partial
no-fault schemes is similarly ambiguous. Under choice, motorists
remaining with tort retain some, but not all, of tort's corrective justice.
They lose corrective justice whenever the defendant is someone who has
waived tort in favor of no-fault's lawsuit immunity. For motorists
choosing no-fault, all vestige of corrective justice is abandoned; there-
fore, the overall "quantum" of corrective justice is determined by the
number of motorists opting for no-fault. By contrast, partial no-fault
places all motorists in the same corrective justice boat. That boat is one
of diminished corrective justice compared with tort, with the degree of
diminishment turning on how completely a given no-fault scheme
preempts tort.
If simple choice is introduced into a partial no-fault scheme, the
quantum of corrective justice can be expected to drop, perhaps drasti-
cally, as motorists waive tort rights. This is less the case with the Con-
gressional neo-partial no-fault choice plan. It may or may not curtail the
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number of tort suits in states with pre-existing partial no-fault, depend-
ing on what option motorists favor and on whether a severe misconduct
threshold preempts more or fewer suits than existing severe injury
thresholds. Those factors aside, the Congressional plan compares favor-
ably with traditional partial no-fault on one crucial corrective justice
consideration. It concentrates suits upon those guilty of the greatest
misbehavior.
XIII. Low-INCOME MOTORISTS
Because high premiums are a major factor in prompting advocacy
for no-fault, it is especially relevant to consider the place of low-income
drivers under tort and no-fault. Benefits or detriments to low-income
drivers may warrant special emphasis in policy evaluation. Tort has
been criticized as particularly harmful and inequitable to low-income
motorists.
First, high premiums are especially unaffordable for low-income
motorists, who sometimes spend staggering proportions of their total
incomes on auto insurance.' 13 This expense may be inescapable for
those who drive to work.
Second, due to urban residence, low-income motorists may pay
average premiums higher in absolute terms, not just in proportion to
income. "'4
Third, low-income drivers on average receive less in tort compen-
sation than high-income drivers, because their lost income component is
lower, and possibly also because their medical care is furnished by
lower-cost providers. 5 Their premiums are not reduced in proportion
to this compensation deficit, because an insured's income is a weak pre-
dictor of the third-party payout risk he imposes on an underwriter. Low-
income motorists are as likely as wealthy ones to cause damage an
insurer might need to indemnify." 6 Because they receive less compen-
sation than the rich from the tort/insurance system but pay nearly as
much, low-income motorists subsidize compensation for wealthier
113. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Allowing Motorists a Choice to Be Legally Uninsured by
Surrendering Tort Claims for Noneconomic Loss (With Some Further Thoughts on Choices
Between PIP and Tort Coverage), I CONN. INS. L.J. 33, 41 (1995). O'Connell indicates poor
families may need to spend up to 30% of income on auto insurance and frequently postpone food
and shelter payments as a result. See id. (citing Robert Lee Maril, The Impact of Mandatory Auto
Insurance Upon Low Income Residents of Maricopa County, Arizona 8-9 (1993) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Connecticut Insurance Law Journal)).
114. See id. at 41.
115. See id. at 41-42.
116. See id. at 41.
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motorists. In effect, they pay for insurance to cover their well-to-do
neighbors.
Fourth, low-income motorists get lower average settlements for
equivalent loss, probably due to inferior education, sophistication, and
lawyering, combined with higher need for quick cash.'"
7
It would be good, somehow, to offer low-income motorists relief
from these burdens and inequities. Some observers contend that no-fault
can accomplish this by reducing premiums overall and by calibrating
low premiums to the low incomes that would yield reduced payouts in
first-party coverage. Because partial no-fault does not deliver premium
reductions and retains tort to a substantial degree, relief for low-income
motorists is not found there. Pure no-fault and choice plans may be
different. There is reason to hope they might deliver reduced premiums
overall by eliminating noneconomic damages, lawyer fees, and litigation
costs. " 8 Arguably, they could also provide specially reduced premiums
to the poor due to first-party risk-rating. Because low-income victims
would file smaller claims than the rich, underwriters might offer them
reduced premiums. 1I9
The prospects for reduced premiums overall are brighter than those
for income-sensitive premium reductions targeted to the poor. Income-
sensitive premium reductions might be slow to emerge, because they
would depend on underwriter aggressiveness in performing income-sen-
sitive risk rating. Incentives would come from the prospect of expanded
sales to low-income customers through reduced premiums made possi-
ble by income-sensitive risk rating. But any kind of risk rating is costly,
due to the information gathering and actuarial analysis required. It takes
place only where its costs are outweighed by revenues garnered through
expanded or protected market shares. There is no guarantee that
income-sensitive first-party risk rating would turn out to be profitable.
If not profitable, it will not happen.
Moreover, first-party risk rating for low-income motorists may
yield counter-intuitive results. Though low-income motorists file rela-
tively smaller claims for equivalent injuries and recovery periods, they
may be more likely to get into accidents in the first place, due to higher
traffic density, road disrepair, and poor traffic regulation in low-income
neighborhoods, and be prone to more severe injuries from driving
cheaper, less safe cars. Such factors compromise incentives to offer
117. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS, 241-42 (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 54, tbl. 3.25 (1970).
118. See AUTO CHOICE REFORM ACT, SUMMARY, supra note 61, and accompanying cites.
119. See O'Connell, supra note 13, at 177.
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targeted low-income premiums, even in a first-party market. Moreover,
average medical care is inferior and rehabilitation for work consequently
less effective for low-income citizens. If so, medical and lost-income
expenses rise, offsetting the advantages of less costly medical care and
lower lost-income sums.
Choice proposals introduce one further critical issue. I suggest
above that a choice system might quickly evolve into a uniform no-fault
system, with pain and suffering damages wiped from the scene by fail-
ure in the first-party insurance market for them, leaving only PIP cover-
age for all. If that is not the case, however, what may emerge instead is
a class system of access to pain and suffering damages.
Under choice, low-income motorists will be more likely to opt for
low-premium no-fault coverage than high-income motorists who can
better afford the high premiums associated with tort. Wealthy motorists
would be more inclined than the poor to retain tort rights to pain and
suffering damages. No-fault's guarantee of compensation without proof
of fault means less to the wealthy whose medical expenses are probably
covered by job-linked health insurance and whose lost income from
physical injury averages less, because they do not live off manual labor.
Though many high-income motorists will choose no-fault anyway and
some low-income motorists will stay with tort, the predictable result is a
class system in which average wealthy victims receive pain and suffer-
ing damages (for fault-based accidents), while average low-income vic-
tims do not.
The implications grow more troubling when one considers that pain
and suffering (along with other non-economic damages) act as a com-
pensation equalizer between poor and wealthy under tort. The poor may
receive less for lost income and medical expenses, but they suffer the
same pain as the rich for mangled limbs and gashed faces, and receive
roughly equivalent pain and suffering damages.
In this light, the tort system seems to affirm equal human worth
between rich and poor, better than a pure no-fault system that eliminates
pain and suffering compensation or a choice system that eliminates it
disproportionately for the poor. Hence, no-fault may subject the poor to
an unintended but very real indignity. True, this indignity may seem
weightless compared with the tangible benefit of providing the poor with
more affordable insurance. But damaged dignity is a paramount feature
of serious personal injury. Redressing and minimizing dignitarian dam-
age are key purposes of delivering compensation and administering cor-
rective justice. Thus, there is reason to pause before adopting




Arguably, these egalitarian/dignitarian objections count less heavily
against choice plans than against universal no-fault. Under choice, the
dignitarian deprivation is chosen, not compulsory as under pure no-fault,
and this may seem to take the sting from any indignity. But this may be
too glib. The "voluntary" aspect of choice no-fault is obviously more
suspect for the poor than for the wealthy who feel less financial con-
straint. Moreover, "voluntary" indignity may sometimes sting more, not
less, because it suggests personal complicity.
Pure no-fault puts rich and poor in the same boat on lost access to
pain and suffering damages. In that sense, it may actually be less offen-
sive to dignitarian values than a choice plan. Moreover, the poor are
insulted more overtly under choice than under pure no-fault. Pure no-
fault widens compensation gaps between rich and poor insofar it bans
pain and suffering damages with their equalizing effect. But this may
insult the poor less tangibly than hearing tales of hefty awards to the rich
under a choice plan where the poor have waived rights to pain and suf-
fering damages.
The particular burden placed on the poor by high premiums under
tort has prompted calls for a modified choice plan exclusively targeted at
low-income motorists. Under such a plan, an option for pure no-fault
would be extended only to low-income drivers, with all other drivers
confined to the preexisting tort or partial no-fault system. A California
proposal along these lines, debated in 1989, was never passed.
2 0
Though some poverty and consumer activists rallied for the plan,
others-Ralph Nader among them-resisted. 12 1 Basic arguments for
and against such proposals are like those just reviewed, but there is one
unique consideration. This kind of targeted choice plan would sharpen
the class dimensions of the system and the seriousness of any attendant
indignities.
In considering the situation of low-income motorists, no-fault pro-
posals need to be compared with proposals to reform treatments of unin-
sured motorists. Reform ideas focused on uninsured motorists would
impact heavily on low-income drivers, who represent the bulk of the
uninsured. Uninsured drivers pose the risk to other motorists of going
uncompensated for injuries. They also seem to cause a disproportionate
share of auto injuries, 122 some probably because their individual driving
records have caused the steep premiums they seek to avoid, others sim-
120. See NAT'L INS. CONSUMER ORG., PAY-AT-THE-PUMP: PRIVATE No-FAULT AUTO
INSURANCE (on file with Connecticut Insurance Law Journal); see also ANDREW TOBIAS, Atrro
INSURANCE ALERT! 57-58 (1993).
121. See Kenneth Reich, Nader Draws Criticism by Consumer for No-Fault View, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 1989, at A3.
122. See O'Connell, supra note 113, at 33-34.
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ply because they are poor and live in dense, high-accident sectors.
Though going uninsured is illegal and not to be admired, it is especially
tempting for the poor, who not only face unaffordably high rates, but
also have fewer assets to protect from lawsuits than do those with more
wealth. For low-income motorists, compulsory insurance is dispropor-
tionately high in cost and low in benefit.
2 3
One reform approach is to deprive the uninsured of rights to sue for
auto accident injuries. This approach, sometimes dubbed "no pay, no
play," has recently been enacted in Louisiana, New Jersey, and Califor-
nia. 124 A version has also been included in the Congressional choice no-
fault bill.' 25 It can be justified as a way of sanctioning motorists who
flaunt required-coverage laws. The problem with "no pay, no play,"
however, is that it strips from uninsured motorists injured by the fault of
others a basic right to seek compensation. The constitutionality of this
may be questioned, but as a form of economic regulation, it probably
passes muster under rationality review, at least for federal constitutional
purposes. The right to sue for personal injury is arguably not fundamen-
tal and disproportionate impact on the poor does not trigger heightened
scrutiny if poverty is not a suspect classification. Moreover, the loss of
rights to sue in tort may be deemed rough justice for the uninsured, who
impose on others a risk of uncompensated injury.
Another problem may be that "no pay, no play" is excessively puni-
tive toward those for whom insurance is least affordable. Especially for
the seriously injured, loss of lawsuit rights may be unduly harsh as a
sanction for non-compliance with compulsory coverage laws. A Louisi-
ana proposal, packaged with a recently-rejected no-fault bill, seemed
alert to these concerns. It stripped lawsuit rights away from compulsory
coverage violators only for the first $10,000 in damages. 126 Like any
such approach, this one conferred a windfall on negligent drivers lucky
enough to injure uninsured motorists. But the sanction on uninsured
motorists was definite in amount and seemed roughly fair.
A recently-proposed modification of "no pay, no play" superficially
seeks to accommodate the uninsured rather than punish them. Under
this proposal, going uninsured would be legalized, but those who do so
123. See id. at 35-37.
124. See Sclafane, supra note 45 (Louisiana and California); see also Robert Schwaneberg,
Uninsured, Drunk Drivers Barred from Suits: Measure Excludes Classes of Motorists from
Pursuing Litigation, STAR-LEDGER (Newark N.J.), July 7, 1997, at 017 (discussing New Jersey
law).
125. See Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2021, 105th Cong. § 6(c)(2).
126. See Sclafane, supra note 45; see Ted Griggs, Judge Hears Arguments on Insurance Law
Changes, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 10, 1997, at IB; see also S. Carl Redman, Insurance
Revamp Is OK'd: Law Would Reduce Car Liability Premiums, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., June 17,
1997, at IA.
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would waive their rights to sue for pain and suffering. 27 The sting of
curtailed right to sue is symbolically numbed by recharacterizing it as
the consequence of a legal choice rather than punishment for scofflaws.
In effect, low-income motorists are allowed to avoid burdensome premi-
ums in return for waiving certain compensation rights. If loss of com-
pensation rights seems harsh, recall that for low-income motorists,
current high premium levels are also harsh.
Such a proposal differs in two respects from the targeted choice
plan for the poor discussed above. First, it allows participation by non-
poor motorists who may elect to go uninsured. This feature could con-
ceivably be deleted by a wealth ceiling on participation. Second, the
choice it offers is not between two systems of premiums and compensa-
tion (first-party and tort), but rather to forego premiums in return for
waiving compensation.
Both the traditional tort system and all reform systems discussed
here, including those defended or even designed as ways to help the
poor, entail some disadvantages for them. Such trade-offs for the poor
can be avoided only through outright subsidies or mandatory preferen-
tial premiums for the poor without exacting any price for them. Short of
this, concern for the poor confronts an array of imperfect reform options,
along with a traditional tort system which is itself especially imperfect
from the standpoint of the poor.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Agitation and debate over auto no-fault are likely to accelerate in
coming years. Fueled mainly by high and rising premiums, the discus-
sion will call attention to no-fault's apparent advantages as a compensa-
tion system. Cost and compensation advantages are greatest when no-
fault is closest to pure. Among existing schemes, this is best approxi-
mated by partial no-fault schemes with stringent verbal thresholds
against pain and suffering suits.
Though studies are mixed, it seems unlikely that no-fault seriously
undermines road safety. It is also unlikely to augment it.
No-fault's cost and compensation advantages must be weighed
against disadvantages in preempting corrective justice values that tort
may vindicate. Neo-partial no-fault, its pain and suffering lawsuit
threshold based on severe misconduct, may strike a reasonable compro-
mise between attaining no-fault's compensation advantages in modest
degree and preserving corrective justice where it matters most. Whether
it can deliver substantial premium cuts is more doubtful.
127. See O'Connell, supra note 113, at 37.
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Choice plans, inspired by consumer sovereignty, may fail to serve
it. They may instead yield no-fault for all, as underwriters and motorists
respond to market incentives, pressures, and failures.
All existing and seriously discussed systems visit hardships and
even inequities upon the poor. On other hand, insofar as they are unin-
sured, the poor deal hardships and even inequities upon others. Policy
options should be weighed for their impacts on the poor with respect to
both of these dimensions.
